Showing posts with label bayes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bayes. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 4, 2017

Bayesian vs. Frequentist Statements About Treatment Efficacy

The following examples are intended to show the advantages of Bayesian reporting of treatment efficacy analysis, as well as to provide examples contrasting with frequentist reporting. As detailed here, there are many problems with p-values, and some of those problems will be apparent in the examples below. Many of the advantages of Bayes are summarized here. As seen below, Bayesian posterior probabilities prevent one from concluding equivalence of two treatments on an outcome when the data do not support that (i.e., the "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" error).

Suppose that a parallel group randomized clinical trial is conducted to gather evidence about the relative efficacy of new treatment B to a control treatment A. Suppose there are two efficacy endpoints: systolic blood pressure (SBP) and time until cardiovascular/cerebrovascular event. Treatment effect on the first endpoint is assumed to be summarized by the B-A difference in true mean SBP. The second endpoint is assumed to be summarized as a true B:A hazard ratio (HR). For the Bayesian analysis, assume that pre-specified skeptical prior distributions were chosen as follows. For the unknown difference in mean SBP, the prior was normal with mean 0 with SD chosen so that the probability that the absolute difference in SBP between A and B exceeds 10mmHg was only 0.05. For the HR, the log HR was assumed to have a normal distribution with mean 0 and SD chosen so that the prior probability that the HR > 2 or HR < 1/2 was 0.05. Both priors specify that it is equally likely that treatment B is effective as it is detrimental. The two prior distributions will be referred to as p1 and p2.

Example 1: So-called "Negative" Trial (Considering only SBP)

  • Frequentist Statement
    • Incorrect Statement: Treatment B did not improve SBP when compared to A (p=0.4)
    • Confusing Statement: Treatment B was not significantly different from treatment A (p=0.4)
    • Accurate Statement: We were unable to find evidence against the hypothesis that A=B (p=0.4). More data will be needed. As the statistical analysis plan specified a frequentist approach, the study did not provide evidence of similarity of A and B (but see the confidence interval below).
    • Supplemental Information: The observed B-A difference in means was 4mmHg with a 0.95 confidence interval of [-5, 13]. If this study could be indefinitely replicated and the same approach used to compute the confidence interval each time, 0.95 of such varying confidence intervals would contain the unknown true difference in means.
  • Bayesian Statement
    • Assuming prior distribution p1 for the mean difference of SBP, the probability that SBP with treatment B is lower than treatment A is 0.67. Alternative statement: SBP is probably (0.67) reduced with treatment B. The probability that B is inferior to A is 0.33. Assuming a minimally clinically important difference in SBP of 3mmHg, the probability that the mean for A is within 3mmHg of the mean for B is 0.53, so the study is uninformative about the question of similarity of A and B.
    • Supplemental Information: The posterior mean difference in SBP was 3.3mmHg and the 0.95 credible interval is [-4.5, 10.5]. The probability is 0.95 that the true treatment effect is in the interval [-4.5, 10.5]. [could include the posterior density function here, with a shaded right tail with area 0.67.]

Example 2: So-called "Positive" Trial

  • Frequentist Statement
    • Incorrect Statement: The probability that there is no difference in mean SBP between A and B is 0.02
    • Confusing Statement: There was a statistically significant difference between A and B (p=0.02).
    • Correct Statement: There is evidence against the null hypothesis of no difference in mean SBP (p=0.02), and the observed difference favors B. Had the experiment been exactly replicated indefinitely, 0.02 of such repetitions would result in more impressive results if A=B.
    • Supplemental Information: Similar to above.
    • Second Outcome Variable, If the p-value is Small: Separate statement, of same form as for SBP.
  • Bayesian Statement
    • Assuming prior p1, the probability that B lowers SBP when compared to A is 0.985. Alternative statement: SBP is probably (0.985) reduced with treatment B. The probability that B is inferior to A is 0.015.
    • Supplemental Information: Similar to above, plus evidence about clinically meaningful effects, e.g.: The probability that B lowers SBP by more than 3mmHg is 0.81.
    • Second Outcome Variable: Bayesian approach allows one to make a separate statement about the clinical event HR and to state evidence about the joint effect of treatment on SBP and HR. Examples: Assuming prior p2, HR is probably (0.79) lower with treatment B. Assuming priors p1 and p2, the probability that treatment B both decreased SBP and decreased event hazard was 0.77. The probability that B improved either of the two endpoints was 0.991.
One would also report basic results. For SBP, frequentist results might be chosen as the mean difference and its standard error. Basic Bayesian results could be said to be the entire posterior distribution of the SBP mean difference.

Note that if multiple looks were made as the trial progressed, the frequentist estimates (including the observed mean difference) would have to undergo complex adjustments. Bayesian results require no modification whatsoever, but just involve reporting the latest available cumulative evidence.

Saturday, April 8, 2017

Statistical Errors in the Medical Literature

Updated 2017-11-04

  1. Misinterpretation of P-values and Main Study Results
  2. Dichotomania
  3. Problems With Change Scores
  4. Improper Subgrouping
  5. Serial Data and Response Trajectories

As Doug Altman famously wrote in his Scandal of Poor Medical Research in BMJ in 1994, the quality of how statistical principles and analysis methods are applied in medical research is quite poor.  According to Doug and to many others such as Richard Smith, the problems have only gotten worse.  The purpose of this blog article is to contain a running list of new papers in major medical journals that are statistically problematic, based on my random encounters with the literature.

One of the most pervasive problems in the medical literature (and in other subject areas) is misuse and misinterpretation of p-values as detailed here, and chief among these issues is perhaps the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence error written about so clearly by Altman and Bland.   The following thought will likely rattle many biomedical researchers but I've concluded that most of the gross misinterpretation of large p-values by falsely inferring that a treatment is not effective is caused by (1) the investigators not being brave enough to conclude "We haven't learned anything from this study", i.e., they feel compelled to believe that their investments of time and money must be worth something, (2) journals accepting such papers without demanding a proper statistical interpretation in the conclusion.  One example of proper wording would be "This study rules out, with 0.95 confidence, a reduction in the odds of death that is more than by a factor of 2."  Ronald Fisher, when asked how to interpret a large p-value, said "Get more data." Adoption of Bayesian methods would solve many problems including this one.  Whether a p-value is small or large a Bayesian can compute the posterior probability of similarity of outcomes of two treatments (e.g., Prob(0.85 < odds ratio < 1/0.85)), and the researcher will often find that this probability is not large enough to draw a conclusion of similarity.  On the other hand, what if even under a skeptical prior distribution the Bayesian posterior probability of efficacy were 0.8 in a "negative" trial?  Would you choose for yourself the standard therapy when it had a 0.2 chance of being better than the new drug? [Note: I am not talking here about regulatory decisions.]  Imagine a Bayesian world where it is standard to report the results for the primary endpoint using language such as:
  • The probability of any efficacy is 0.94 (so the probability of non-efficacy is 0.06).
  • The probability of efficacy greater than a factor of 1.2 is 0.78 (odds ratio < 1/1.2).
  • >The probability of similarity to within a factor of 1.2 is 0.3.
  • The probability that the true odds ratio is between [0.6, 0.99] is 0.95 (credible interval; doesn't use the long-run tendency of confidence intervals to include the true value for 0.95 of confidence intervals computed).
In a so-called "negative" trial we frequently see the phrase "treatment B was not significantly different from treatment A" without thinking out how little information that carries.  Was the power really adequate? Is the author talking about an observed statistic (probably yes) or the true unknown treatment effect?  Why should we care more about statistical significance than clinical significance?  The phrase "was not significantly different" seems to be a way to avoid the real issues of interpretation of large p-values. Since my #1 area of study is statistical modeling, especially predictive modeling, I pay a lot of attention to model development and model validation as done in the medical literature, and I routinely encounter published papers where the authors do not have basic understanding of the statistical principles involved.  This seems to be especially true when a statistician is not among the paper's authors.  I'll be commenting on papers in which I encounter statistical modeling, validation, or interpretation problems.

Misinterpretation of P-values and of Main Study Results

One of the most problematic examples I've seen is in the March 2017 paper Levosimendan in Patients with Left Ventricular Dysfunction Undergoing Cardiac Surgery by Rajenda Mehta in the New England Journal of Medicine.  The study was designed to detect a miracle - a 35% relative odds reduction with drug compared to placebo, and used a power requirement of only 0.8 (type II error a whopping 0.2).  [The study also used some questionable alpha-spending that Bayesians would find quite odd.]  For the primary endpoint, the adjusted odds ratio was 1.00 with 0.99 confidence interval [0.66, 1.54] and p=0.98.  Yet the authors concluded "Levosimendan was not associated with a rate of the composite of death, renal-replacement therapy, perioperative myocardial infarction, or use of a mechanical cardiac assist device that was lower than the rate with placebo among high-risk patients undergoing cardiac surgery with the use of cardiopulmonary bypass."   Their own data are consistent with a 34% reduction (as well as a 54% increase)!  Almost nothing was learned from this underpowered study.  It may have been too disconcerting for the authors and the journal editor to have written "We were only able to rule out a massive benefit of drug."  [Note: two treatments can have agreement in outcome probabilities by chance just as they can have differences by chance.]  It would be interesting to see the Bayesian posterior probability that the true unknown odds ratio is in [0.85, 1/0.85]. The primary endpoint is the union of death, dialysis, MI, or use of a cardiac assist device.  This counts these four endpoints as equally bad.  An ordinal response variable would have yielded more statistical information/precision and perhaps increased power.  And instead of dealing with multiplicity issues and alpha-spending, the multiple endpoints could have been dealt with more elegantly with a Bayesian analysis.  For example, one could easily compute the joint probability that the odds ratio for the primary endpoint is less than 0.8 and the odds ratio for the secondary endpoint is less than 1 [the secondary endpoint was death or assist device and and is harder to demonstrate because of its lower incidence, and is perhaps more of a "hard endpoint"].  In the Bayesian world of forward directly relevant probabilities there is no need to consider multiplicity.  There is only a need to state the assertions for which one wants to compute current probabilities.
The paper also contains inappropriate assessments of interactions with treatment using subgroup analysis with arbitrary cutpoints on continuous baseline variables and failure to adjust for other main effects when doing the subgroup analysis.
This paper had a fine statistician as a co-author.  I can only conclude that the pressure to avoid disappointment with a conclusion of spending a lot of money with little to show for it was in play.
Why was such an underpowered study launched?  Why do researchers attempt "hail Mary passes"?  Is a study that is likely to be futile fully ethical?   Do medical journals allow this to happen because of some vested interest?

Similar Examples

Perhaps the above example is no worse than many.  Examples of "absence of evidence" misinterpretations abound.  Consider the JAMA paper by Kawazoe et al published 2017-04-04.  They concluded that "Mortality at 28 days was not significantly different in the dexmedetomidine group vs the control group (19 patients [22.8%] vs 28 patients [30.8%]; hazard ratio, 0.69; 95% CI, 0.38-1.22;P > = .20)."  The point estimate was a reduction in hazard of death by 31% and the data are consistent with the reduction being as large as 62%! Or look at this 2017-03-21 JAMA article in which the authors concluded "Among healthy postmenopausal older women with a mean baseline serum 25-hydroxyvitamin D level of 32.8 ng/mL, supplementation with vitamin D3 and calcium compared with placebo did not result in a significantly lower risk of all-type cancer at 4 years." even though the observed hazard ratio was 0.7, with lower confidence limit of a whopping 53% reduction in the incidence of cancer.  And the 0.7 was an unadjusted hazard ratio; the hazard ratio could well have been more impressive had covariate adjustment been used to account for outcome heterogeneity within each treatment arm.
An incredibly high-profile paper published online 2017-11-02 in The Lancet demonstrates a lack of understanding of some statistical issues. In Percutaneous coronary intervention in stable angina (ORBITA): a double-blind, randomised controlled trial by Rasha Al-Lamee et al, the authors (or was it the journal editor?) boldly claimed "In patients with medically treated angina and severe coronary stenosis, PCI did not increase exercise time by more than the effect of a placebo procedure." The authors are to be congratulated on using a rigorous sham control, but the authors, reviewers, and editor allowed a classic absence of evidence is not evidence of absence error to be made in attempting to interpret p=0.2 for the primary analysis of exercise time in this small (n=200) RCT. In doing so they ignored the useful (but flawed; see below) 0.95 confidence interval of this effect of [-8.9, 42] seconds of exercise time increase for PCI. Thus their data are consistent with a 42 second increase in exercise time by real PCI. It is also important to note that the authors fell into the change from baseline trap by disrespecting their own parallel group design. They should have asked the covariate-adjusted question: For two patients starting with the same exercise capacity, one assigned PCI and one assigned PCI sham, what is the average difference in follow-up exercise time?
But there are other ways to view this study. Sham studies are difficult to fund and difficult to recruit large number of patients. Criticizing the interpretation of the statistical analysis fails to recognize the value of the study. One value is the study's ruling out an exercise time improvement greater than 42s (with 0.95 confidence). If, as several cardiologists have told me, 42s is not very meaningful to the patient, then the study is definitive and clinically relevant. I just wish that authors and especially editors would use exactly correct language in abstracts of articles. For this trial, suitable language would have been along these lines: The study did not find evidence against the null hypothesis of no change in exercise time (p=0.2), but was able to (with 0.95 confidence) rule out an effect larger than 42s. A Bayesian analysis would have been even more clinically useful. For example, one might find that the posterior probability that the increase in exercise time with PCI is less than 20s is 0.97. And our infatuation with 2-tailed p-values comes into play here. A Bayesian posterior probability of any improvement might be around 0.88, far more "positive" than what someone who misunderstands p-values would conclude from an "insignificant" p-value. Other thoughts concerning the ORBITA trial may be found here.

Dichotomania

Dichotomania, as discussed by Stephen Senn, is a very prevalent problem in medical and epidemiologic research.  Categorization of continuous variables for analysis is inefficient at best and misleading and arbitrary at worst.  This JAMA paper by VISION study investigators "Association of Postoperative High-Sensitivity Troponin Levels With Myocardial Injury and 30-Day Mortality Among Patients Undergoing Noncardiac Surgery" is an excellent example of bad statistical practice that limits the amount of information provided by the study.  The authors categorized high-sensitivity troponin T levels measured post-op and related these to the incidence of death.  They used four intervals of troponin, and there is important heterogeneity of patients within these intervals.  This is especially true for the last interval (> 1000 ng/L).  Mortality may be much higher for troponin values that are much larger than 1000.  The relationship should have been analyzed with a continuous analysis, e.g., logistic regression with a regression spline for troponin, nonparametric smoother, etc.  The final result could be presented in a simple line graph with confidence bands. An example of dichotomania that may not be surpassed for some time is Simplification of the HOSPITAL Score for Predicting 30-day Readmissions by Carole E Aubert, et al in BMJ Quality and Safety 2017-04-17. The authors arbitrarily dichotomized several important predictors, resulting in a major loss of information, then dichotomized their resulting predictive score, sacrificing much of what information remained. The authors failed to grasp probabilities, resulting in risk of 30-day readmission of "unlikely" and "likely". The categorization of predictor variables leaves demonstrable outcome heterogeneity within the intervals of predictor values. Then taking an already oversimplified predictive score and dichotomizing it is essentially saying to the reader "We don't like the integer score we just went to the trouble to develop." I now have serious doubts about the thoroughness of reviews at BMJ Quality and Safety.
A very high-profile paper was published in BMJ on 2017-06-06: Moderate alcohol consumption as risk factor for adverse brain outcomes and cognitive decline: longitudinal cohort study by Anya Topiwala et al. The authors had a golden opportunity to estimate the dose-response relationship between amount of alcohol consumed and quantitative brain changes. Instead the authors squandered the data by doing analyzes that either assumed that responses are linear in alcohol consumption or worse, by splitting consumption into 6 heterogeneous intervals when in fact consumption was shown in their Figure 3 to have a nice continuous distribution. How much more informative (and statistically powerful) it would have been to fit a quadratic or a restricted cubic spline function to consumption to estimate the continuous dose-response curve.
The NEJM keeps giving us great teaching examples with its 2017-08-03 edition. In Angiotensin II for the treatment of vasodilatory shock by Ashish Khanna et al, the authors constructed a bizarre response variable: "The primary end point was a response with respect to mean arterial pressure at hour 3 after the start of infusion, with response defined as an increase from baseline of at least 10 mm Hg or an increase to at least 75 mm Hg, without an increase in the dose of background vasopressors." This form of dichotomania has been discredited by Stephen Senn who provided a similar example in which he decoded the response function to show that the lucky patient is one (in the NEJM case) who has a starting blood pressure of 74mmHg. His example is below:

When a clinical trial's response variable is one that is arbitrary, loses information and power, is difficult to interpret, and means different things for different patients, expect trouble.

Change from Baseline

Many authors and pharmaceutical clinical trialists make the mistake of analyzing change from baseline instead of making the raw follow-up measurements the primary outcomes, covariate-adjusted for baseline.  To compute change scores requires many assumptions to hold, e.g.:
  1. the variable is not used as an inclusion/exclusion criterion for the study, otherwise regression to the mean will be strong
  2. if the variable is used to select patients for the study, a second post-enrollment baseline is measured and this baseline is the one used for all subsequent analysis
  3. the post value must be linearly related to the pre value
  4. the variable must be perfectly transformed so that subtraction "works" and the result is not baseline-dependent
  5. the variable must not have floor and ceiling effects
  6. the variable must have a smooth distribution
  7. the slope of the pre value vs. the follow-up measurement must be close to 1.0 when both variables are properly transformed (using the same transformation on both)
Details about problems with analyzing change may be found in BBR Section 14.4 and here, and references may be found here. See also this.  A general problem with the approach is that when Y is ordinal but not interval-scaled, differences in Y may no longer be ordinal.  So analysis of change loses the opportunity to do a robust, powerful analysis using a covariate-adjusted ordinal response model such as the proportional odds or proportional hazards model.  Such ordinal response models do not require one to be correct in how to transform Y. Regarding 3. above, if pre is not linearly related to post, there is no transformation that can make a change score work.
Regarding 7. above, often the baseline is not as relevant as thought and the slope will be less than 1.  When the treatment can cure every patient, the slope will be zero.  Sometimes the relationship between baseline and follow-up Y is not even linear, as in one example I've seen based on the Hamilton D depression scale.
The purpose of a parallel-group randomized clinical trial is to compare the parallel groups, not to compare a patient with herself at baseline. The central question is for two patients with the same pre measurement value of x, one given treatment A and the other treatment B, will the patients tend to have different post-treatment values? This is exactly what analysis of covariance assesses.  Within-patient change is affected strongly by regression to the mean and measurement error.  When the baseline value is one of the patient inclusion/exclusion criteria, the only meaningful change score requires one to have a second baseline measurement post patient qualification to cancel out much of the regression to the mean effect.  It is he second baseline that would be subtracted from the follow-up measurement.
The savvy researcher knows that analysis of covariance is required to "rescue" a change score analysis. This effectively cancels out the change score and gives the right answer even if the slope of post on pre is not 1.0. But this works only in the linear model case, and it can be confusing to have the pre variable on both the left and right hand sides of the statistical model. And if Y is ordinal but not interval-scaled, the difference in two ordinal variables is no longer even ordinal. Think of how meaningless difference from baseline in ordinal pain categories are. A major problem in the use of change score summaries, even when a correct analysis of covariance has been done, is that many papers and drug product labels still quote change scores out of context.
Patient-reported outcome scales are particularly problematic.  An article published 2017-05-07 in JAMA, doi:10.1001/jama.2017.5103 like many other articles makes the error of trusting change from baseline as an appropriate analysis variable.  Mean change from baseline may not apply to anyone in the trial.  Consider a 5-point ordinal pain scale with values Y=1,2,3,4,5.  Patients starting with no pain (Y=1) cannot improve, so their mean change must be zero.  Patients starting at Y=5 have the most opportunity to improve, so their mean change will be large.  A treatment that improves pain scores by an average of one point may average a two point improvement for patients for whom any improvement is possible.  Stating mean changes out of context of the baseline state can be meaningless.
The NEJM paper Treatment of Endometriosis-Associated Pain with Elagolix, an Oral GnRH Antagonist by Hugh Taylor et al is based on a disastrous set of analyses, combining all the problems above. The authors computed change from baseline on variables that do not have the correct properties for subtraction, engaged in dichotomania by doing responder analysis, and in addition used last observation carried forward to handle dropouts. A proper analysis would have been a longitudinal analysis using all available data that avoided imputation of post-dropout values and used raw measurements as the responses. Most importantly, the twin clinical trials randomized 872 women, and had proper analyses been done the required sample size to achieve the same power would have been far less. Besides the ethical issue of randomizing an unnecessarily large number of women to inferior treatment, the approach used by the investigators maximized the cost of these positive trials.
The NEJM paper Oral Glucocorticoid–Sparing Effect of Benralizumab in Severe Asthma by Parameswaran Nair et al not only takes the problematic approach of using change scores from baseline in a parallel group design but they used percent change from baseline as the raw data in the analysis. This is an asymmetric measure for which arithmetic doesn't work. For example, suppose that one patient increases from 1 to 2 and another decreases from 2 to 1. The corresponding percent changes are 100% and -50%. The overall summary should be 0% change, not +25% as found by taking the simple average. Doing arithmetic on percent change can essentially involve adding ratios; ratios that are not proportions are never added; they are multiplied. What was needed was an analysis of covariance of raw oral glucocorticoid dose values adjusted for baseline after taking an appropriate transformation of dose, or using a more robust transformation-invariant ordinal semi-parametric model on the raw follow-up doses (e.g., proportional odds model).
In Trial of Cannabidiol for Drug-Resistant Seizures in the Dravet Syndrome in NEJM 2017-05-25, Orrin Devinsky et al take seizure frequency, which might have a nice distribution such as the Poisson, and compute its change from baseline, which is likely to have a hard-to-model distribution. Once again, authors failed to recognize that the purpose of a parallel group design is to compare the parallel groups. Then the authors engaged in improper subtraction, improper use of percent change, dichotomania, and loss of statistical power simultaneously: "The percentage of patients who had at least a 50% reduction in convulsive-seizure frequency was 43% with cannabidiol and 27% with placebo (odds ratio, 2.00; 95% CI, 0.93 to 4.30; P=0.08)." The authors went on to analyze the change in a discrete ordinal scale, where change (subtraction) cannot have a meaning independent of the starting point at baseline.
Troponins (T) are myocardial proteins that are released when the heart is damaged. A high-sensitivity T assay is a high-information cardiac biomarker used to diagnose myocardial infarction and to assess prognosis. I have been hoping to find a well-designed study with standardized serially measured T that is optimally analyzed, to provide answers to the following questions:
  1. What is the shape of the relationship between the latest T measurement and time until a clinical endpoint?
  2. How does one use a continuous T to estimate risk?
  3. If T were measured previously, does the previous measurement add any predictive information to the current T?
  4. If both the earlier and current T measurement are needed to predict outcome, how should they be combined? Is what's important the difference of the two? Is it the ratio? Is it the difference in square roots of T?
  5. Is the 99th percentile of T for normal subjects useful as a prognostic threshold?
The 2017-05-16 Circulation paper Serial Measurement of High-Sensitivity Troponin I and Cardiovascular Outcomes in Patients With Type 2 Diabetes Mellitus in the EXAMINE Trial by Matthew Cavender et al was based on a well-designed cardiovascular safety study of diabetes in which uniformly measured high-sensitivity troponin I measurements were made at baseline and six months after randomization to the diabetes drug Alogliptin. [Note: I was on the DSMB for this study] The authors nicely envisioned a landmark analysis based on six-month survivors. But instead of providing answers to the questions above, the authors engaged in dichotomania and never checked whether changes in T or changes in log T possessed the appropriate properties to be used as a valid change score, i.e., they did not plot change in T vs. baseline T or log T ratio vs. baseline T and demonstrate a flat line relationship. Their statistical analysis used statistical methods from 50 years ago, even doing the notorious "test for trend" that tests for a linear correlation between an outcome and an integer category interval number. The authors seem to be unaware of the many flexible tools developed (especially starting in the mid 1980s) for statistical modeling that would answer the questions posed above. Cavender et all stratified T in <1.9 ng/L, 1.9-<10 ng/L, 10-<26 ng/L, and ≥26 ng/L. Fully 1/2 of the patients were in the second interval. Except for the first interval (T below the lower detection limit) the groups are heterogeneous with regard to outcome risks. And there are no data from this study or previous studies that validates these cutpoints. To validate them, the relationship between T and outcome risk would have to be shown to be discontinuous at the cutpoints, and flat between them.
From their paper we still don't know how to use T continuously, and we don't know whether baseline T is informative once a clinician has obtained an updated T. The inclusion of a 3-D block diagram in the supplemental material is symptomatic of the data presentation problems in this paper.
It's not as though T hasn't been analyzed correctly. In a 1996 NEJM paper, Ohman et al used a nonparametric smoother to estimate the continuous relationship between T and 30-day risk. Instead, Cavender, et al created arbitrary heterogeneous intervals of both baseline and 6m T, then created various arbitrary ways to look at change from baseline and its relationship to risk.
An analysis that would have answered my questions would have been to
  1. Fit a standard Cox proportional hazards time-to-event model with the usual baseline characteristics
  2. Add to this model a tensor spline in the baseline and 6m T levels, i.e., a smooth 3-D relationship between baseline T, 6m T, and log hazard, allowing for interaction, and restricting the 3-D surface to be smooth. See for example BBR Figure 4.23. One can do this by using restricted cubic splines in both T's and by computing cross-products of these terms for the interactions. By fitting a flexible smooth surface, the data would be able to speak for themselves without imposing linearity or additivity assumptions and without assuming that change or change in log T is how these variables combine.
  3. Do a formal test of whether baseline T (as either a main effect or as an effect modifier of the 6m T effect, i.e., interaction effect) is associated with outcome when controlling for 6m T and ordinary baseline variables
  4. Quantify the prognostic value added by baseline T by computing the fraction of likelihood ratio chi-square due to both T's combined that is explained by baseline T. Do likewise to show the added value of 6m T. Details about these methods may be found in Regression Modeling Strategies, 2nd edition
Without proper analyses of T as a continuous variable, the reader is left with confusion as to how to really use T in practice, and is given no insight into whether changes are relevant or the baseline T can be ignored with a later T is obtained. In all the clinical outcome studies I've analyzed (including repeated LV ejection fractions and serum creatinines), the latest measurement has been what really mattered, and it hasn't mattered very much how the patient got there. As long as continuous markers are categorized, clinicians are going to get suboptimal risk prediction and are going to find that more markers need to be added to the model to recover the information lost by categorizing the original markers. They will also continue to be surprised that other researchers find different "cutpoints", not realizing that when things don't exist, people will forever argue about their manifestations.

Improper Subgrouping

The JAMA Internal Medicine Paper Effect of Statin Treatment vs Usual Care on Primary Cardiovascular Prevention Among Older Adults by Benjamin Han et al makes the classic statistical error of attempting to learn about differences in treatment effectiveness by subgrouping rather than by correctly modeling interactions. They compounded the error by not adjusting for covariates when comparing treatments in the subgroups, and even worse, by subgrouping on a variable for which grouping is ill-defined and information-losing: age. They used age intervals of 65-74 and 75+. A proper analysis would have been, for example, modeling age as a smooth nonlinear function (e.g., using a restricted cubic spline) and interacting this function with treatment to allow for a high-resolution, non-arbitrary analysis that allows for nonlinear interaction. Results could be displayed by showing the estimated treatment hazard ratio and confidence bands (y-axis) vs. continuous age (x-axis). The authors' analysis avoids the question of a dose-response relationship between age and treatment effect. A full strategy for interaction modeling for assessing heterogeneity of treatment effect (AKA precision medicine) may be found in the analysis of covariance chapter in Biostatistics for Biomedical Research. To make matters worse, the above paper included patients with a sharp cutoff of 65 years of age as the lower limit. How much more informative it would have been to have a linearly increasing (in age) enrollment function that reaches a probability of 1.0 at 65y. Assuming that something magic happens at age 65 with regard to cholesterol reduction is undoubtedly a mistake.

Serial Data and Response Trajectories

Serial data (aka longitudinal data) with multiple follow-up assessments per patient presents special challenges and opportunities. My preferred analysis strategy uses full likelihood or Bayesian continuous-time analysis, using generalized least squares or mixed effects models. This allows each patient to have different measurement times, analysis of the data using actual days since randomization instead of clinic visit number, and non-random dropouts as long as the missing data are missing at random. Missing at random here means that given the baseline variables and the previous follow-up measurements the current measurement is missing completely at random. Imputation is not needed. In the Hypertension July 2017 article Heterogeneity in Early Responses in ALLHAT (Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial) by Sanket Dhruva et al, the authors did advanced statistical analysis that is a level above the papers discussed elsewhere in this article. However, their claim of avoiding dichotomania is unfounded. The authors were primarily interested in the relationship between blood pressures measured at randomization, 1m, 3m, 6m with post-6m outcomes, and they correctly envisioned the analysis as a landmark analysis of patients who were event-free at 6m. They did a careful cluster analysis of blood pressure trajectories from 0-6m. But their chosen method assumes that the variety of trajectories falls into two simple homogeneous trajectory classes (immediate responders and all others). Trajectories of continuous measurements, like the continuous measurements themselves, rarely fall into discrete categories with shape and level homogeneity within the categories. The analyses would in my opinion have been better, and would have been simpler, had everything been considered on a continuum.
With landmark analysis we now have 4 baseline measurements: the new baseline (previously called the 6m blood pressure) and 3 historical measurements. One can use these as 4 covariates to predict time until clinical post-6m outcome using a standard time-to-event model such as the Cox proportional hazards model. In doing so, we are estimating the prognosis associated with every possible trajectory and we can solve for the trajectory that yields the best outcome. We can also do a formal statistical test for whether the trajectories can be summarized more simply than with a 4-dimensional construct, e.g., whether the final blood pressure contains all the prognostic information. Besides specifying the model with baseline covariates (in addition to other original baseline covariates), one also has the option of creating a tall and thin dataset with 4 records per patient (if correlations are accounted for, e.g., cluster sandwich or cluster bootstrap covariance estimates) and modeling outcome using updated covariates and possible interactions with time to allow for time-varying blood pressure effects.
A logistic regression trick described in my book Regression Modeling Strategies comes in handy for modeling how baseline characteristics such as sex, age, or randomized treatment relate to the trajectories. Here one predicts the baseline variable of interest using the four blood pressures. By studying the 4 regression coefficients one can see exactly how the trajectories differ between patients grouped by the baseline variable. This includes studying differences in trajectories by treatment with no dichotomization. For example, if there is a significant association (using a composite (chunk) test) between treatment and any of the 4 blood pressures and in the logistic model predicting treatment, that implies that the reverse is true: one or more of the blood pressures is associated with treatment. Suppose for example that a 4 d.f. test demonstrates some association, the 1 d.f. for the first blood pressure is very significant, and the 3 d.f. test for the last 3 blood pressures is not. This would be interpreted as the treatment having an early effect that wears off shortly thereafter. [For this particular study, with the first measurement being made pre-randomization, such a result would indicate failure of randomization and no blood-pressure response to treatment of any kind.] Were the 4 regression coefficients to be negative and in descending order, this would indicate a progressive reduction in blood pressure due to treatment.
Returning to the originally stated preferred analysis when blood pressure is the outcome of interest (and not time to clinical events), one can use generalized least squares to predict the longitudinal blood pressure trends from treatment. This will be more efficient and also allows one to adjust for baseline variables other than treatment. It would probably be best to make the original baseline blood pressure a baseline variable and to have 3 serial measurements in the longitudinal model. Time would usually be modeled continuously (e.g., using a restricted cubic spline function). But in the Dhruva article the measurements were made at a small number of discrete times, so time could be considered a categorical variable with 3 levels.
I have had misgivings for many years about the quality of statistical methods used by the Channing Lab at Harvard, as well as misgivings about the quality of nutritional epidemiology research in general. My misgivings were again confirmed in the 2017-07-13 NEJM publication Association of Changes in Diet Quality with Total and Cause-Specific Mortality by Mercedes Sotos-Prieto et al. There are the usual concerns about confounding and possible alternate explanations, which the authors did not fully deal with (and why did the authors not include an analysis that characterized which types of subjects tended to have changes in their dietary quality?). But this paper manages to combine dichotomania with probably improper change score analysis and hard-to-interpret results. It started off as a nicely conceptualized landmark analysis in which dietary quality scores were measured during both an 8-year and a 16-year period, and these scores were related to total and all-cause mortality following those landmark periods. But then things went seriously wrong. The authors computed change in diet scores from the start to the end of the qualification period, did not validate that these are proper change scores (see above for more about that), and engaged in percentiling as if the number of neighbors with worse diets than you is what predicts your mortality rather than the absolute quality of your own diet. They then grouped the changes into quintile groups without justification, and examined change quantile score group effects in Cox time-to-event models. It is telling that the baseline dietary scores varied greatly over the change quintiles. The authors emphasized the 20-percentile increase in each score when interpreting result. What does that mean? How is it related to absolute diet quality scores?
The high quality dataset available to the authors could have been used to answer real questions of interest using statistical analyses that did not have hidden assumptions. From their analyses we have no idea of how the subjects' diet trajectories affected mortality, or indeed whether then change in diet quality was as important as the most recent diet quality for the subject, ignoring how the subject arrived at that point at the end of the qualification period. What would be an informative analysis? Start with the simpler one: used a smooth tensor spline interaction surface to estimate relative log hazard of mortality, and construct a 3-D plot with initial diet quality on the x-axis, final (landmark) diet quality on the y-axis, and relative log hazard on the z-axis. Then the more in-depth modeling analysis can be done in which one uses multiple measures of diet quality over time and relates the trajectory (its shape, average level, etc.) to hazard of death. Suppose that absolute diet quality was measured at four baseline points. These four variables could be related to outcome and one could solve for the trajectory that was associated with the lowest mortality. For a study that is almost wholly statistical, it is a shame that modern statistical methods appeared to not even be considered. And for heaven's sake analyze the raw diet scales and do not percentile them.



































Sunday, February 19, 2017

My Journey From Frequentist to Bayesian Statistics

Type I error for smoke detector: probability of alarm given no fire=0.05
Bayesian: probability of fire given current air data

Frequentist smoke alarm designed as most research is done:
Set the alarm trigger so as to have a 0.8 chance of detecting an inferno

Advantage of actionable evidence quantification:
Set the alarm to trigger when the posterior probability of a fire exceeds 0.02 while at home and at 0.01 while away


If I had been taught Bayesian modeling before being taught the frequentist paradigm, I'm sure I would have always been a Bayesian.  I started becoming a Bayesian about 1994 because of an influential paper by David Spiegelhalter and because I worked in the same building at Duke University as Don Berry.  Two other things strongly contributed to my thinking: difficulties explaining p-values and confidence intervals (especially the latter) to clinical researchers, and difficulty of learning group sequential methods in clinical trials.  When I talked with Don and learned about the flexibility of the Bayesian approach to clinical trials, and saw Spiegelhalter's embrace of Bayesian methods because of its problem-solving abilities, I was hooked.  [Note: I've heard Don say that he became Bayesian after multiple attempts to teach statistics students the exact definition of a confidence interval.  He decided the concept was defective.]

At the time I was working on clinical trials at Duke and started to see that multiplicity adjustments were arbitrary.  This started with a clinical trial coordinated by Duke in which low dose and high dose of a new drug were to be compared to placebo, using an alpha cutoff of 0.03 for each comparison to adjust for multiplicity.  The comparison of high dose with placebo resulted in a p-value of 0.04 and the trial was labeled completely "negative" which seemed problematic to me. [Note: the p-value was two-sided and thus didn't give any special "credit" for the treatment effect coming out in the right direction.]

I began to see that the hypothesis testing framework wasn't always the best approach to science, and that in biomedical research the typical hypothesis was an artificial construct designed to placate a reviewer who believed that an NIH grant's specific aims must include null hypotheses.  I saw the contortions that investigators went through to achieve this, came to see that questions are more relevant than hypotheses, and estimation was even more important than questions.   With Bayes, estimation is emphasized.  I very much like Bayesian modeling instead of hypothesis testing.  I saw that a large number of clinical trials were incorrectly interpreted when p>0.05 because the investigators involved failed to realize that a p-value can only provide evidence against a hypothesis. Investigators are motivated by "we spent a lot of time and money and must have gained something from this experiment." The classic "absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" error results, whereas with Bayes it is easy to estimate the probability of similarity of two treatments.  Investigators will be surprised to know how little we have learned from clinical trials that are not huge when p>0.05.

I listened to many discussions of famous clinical trialists debating what should be the primary endpoint in a trial, the co-primary endpoint, the secondary endpoints, co-secondary endpoints, etc.  This was all because of their paying attention to alpha-spending.  I realized this was all a game.

I came to not believe in the possibility of infinitely many repetitions of identical experiments, as required to be envisioned in the frequentist paradigm.  When I looked more thoroughly into the multiplicity problem, and sequential testing, and I looked at Bayesian solutions, I became more of a believer in the approach.  I learned that posterior probabilities have a simple interpretation independent of the stopping rule and frequency of data looks.  I got involved in working with the FDA and then consulting with pharmaceutical companies, and started observing how multiple clinical endpoints were handled.  I saw a closed testing procedures where a company was seeking a superiority claim for a new drug, and if there was insufficient evidence for such a claim, they wanted to seek a non-inferiority claim on another endpoint.  They developed a closed testing procedure that when diagrammed truly looked like a train wreck.  I felt there had to be a better approach, so I sought to see how far posterior probabilities could be pushed.  I found that with MCMC simulation of Bayesian posterior draws I could quite simply compute probabilities such as P(any efficacy), P(efficacy more than trivial), P(non-inferiority), P(efficacy on endpoint A and on either endpoint B or endpoint C), and P(benefit on more than 2 of 5 endpoints).  I realized that frequentist multiplicity problems came from the chances you give data to be more extreme, not from the chances you give assertions to be true.

I enjoy the fact that posterior probabilities define their own error probabilities, and that they count not only inefficacy but also harm.  If P(efficacy)=0.97, P(no effect or harm)=0.03.  This is the "regulator's regret", and type I error is not the error of major interest (is it really even an 'error'?).  One minus a p-value is P(data in general are less extreme than that observed if H0 is true) which is the probability of an event I'm not that interested in.

The extreme amount of time I spent analyzing data led me to understand other problems with the frequentist approach.  Parameters are either in a model or not in a model.  We test for interactions with treatment and hope that the p-value is not between 0.02 and 0.2.  We either include the interactions or exclude them, and the power for the interaction test is modest.  Bayesians have a prior for the differential treatment effect and can easily have interactions "half in" the model.  Dichotomous irrevocable decisions are at the heart of many of the statistical modeling problems we have today.  I really like penalized maximum likelihood estimation (which is really empirical Bayes) but once we have a penalized model all of our frequentist inferential framework fails us.  No one can interpret a confidence interval for a biased (shrunken; penalized) estimate.  On the other hand, the Bayesian posterior probability density function, after shrinkage is accomplished using skeptical priors, is just as easy to interpret as had the prior been flat.  For another example, consider a categorical predictor variable that we hope is predicting in an ordinal (monotonic) fashion.  We tend to either model it as ordinal or as completely unordered (using k-1 indicator variables for k categories).  A Bayesian would say "let's use a prior that favors monotonicity but allows larger sample sizes to override this belief."

Now that adaptive and sequential experiments are becoming more popular, and a formal mechanism is needed to use data from one experiment to inform a later experiment (a good example being the use of adult clinical trial data to inform clinical trials on children when it is difficult to enroll a sufficient number of children for the child data to stand on their own), Bayes is needed more than ever.  It took me a while to realize something that is quite profound: A Bayesian solution to a simple problem (e.g., 2-group comparison of means) can be embedded into a complex design (e.g., adaptive clinical trial) without modification.  Frequentist solutions require highly complex modifications to work in the adaptive trial setting.

I met likelihoodist Jeffrey Blume in 2008 and started to like the likelihood approach.  It is more Bayesian than frequentist.  I plan to learn more about this paradigm. 

Several readers have asked me how I could believe all this and publish a frequentist-based book such as Regression Modeling Strategies.  There are two primary reasons.  First, I started writing the book before I knew much about Bayes.  Second, I performed a lot of simulation studies that showed that purely empirical model-building had a low chance of capturing clinical phenomena correctly and of validating on new datasets.  I worked extensively with cardiologists such as Rob Califf, Dan Mark, Mark Hlatky, David Prior, and Phil Harris who give me the ideas for injecting clinical knowledge into model specification.  From that experience I wrote Regression Modeling Strategies in the most Bayesian way I could without actually using specific  Bayesian methods.  I did this by emphasizing subject-matter-guided model specification.  The section in the book about specification of interaction terms is perhaps the best example.  When I teach the full-semester version of my course I interject Bayesian counterparts to many of the techniques covered.

There are challenges in moving more to a Bayesian approach.  The ones I encounter most frequently are:
  1. Teaching clinical trialists to embrace Bayes when they already do in spirit but not operationally.  Unlearning things is much more difficult than learning things.
  2. How to work with sponsors, regulators, and NIH principal investigators to specify the (usually skeptical) prior up front, and to specify the amount of applicability assumed for previous data.
  3. What is a Bayesian version of the multiple degree of freedom "chunk test"?  Partitioning sums of squares or the log likelihood into components, e.g., combined test of interaction and combined test of nonlinearities, is very easy and natural in the frequentist setting.
  4. How do we specify priors for complex entities such as the degree of monotonicity of the effect of a continuous predictor in a regression model?  The Bayesian approach to this will ultimately be more satisfying, but operationalizing this is not easy.
With new tools such as Stan and well written accessible books such as Kruschke's it's getting to be easier to be Bayesian each day.  The R brms package, which uses Stan, makes a large class of regression models even more accessible.

Update 2017-12-29

Another reason for moving from frequentism to Bayes is that frequentist ideas are so confusing that even expert statisticians frequently misunderstand them, and are tricked into dichotomous thinking because of the adoption of null hypothesis significance testing (NHST).   The paper by BB McShane and D Gal in JASA demonstrates alarming errors in interpretation by many authors of JASA papers.  If those with a high level of statistical training make frequent interpretation errors could frequentist statistics be fundamentally flawed?  Yes!  In McShane and Gal's paper they described two surveys sent to authors of JASA, as well as to authors of articles not appearing in the statistical literature (luckily for statisticians the non-statisticians fared a bit worse).   Some of their key findings are as follows.

  1. When a p-value is present, (primarily frequentist) statisticians confuse population vs. sample, especially if the p-value is large.  Even when directly asked whether patients in this sample fared batter on one treatment than the other, the respondents often answered according to whether or not p < 0.05.  Dichotomous thinking crept in.
  2. When asked whether evidence from the data made it more or less likely that a drug is beneficial in the population, many statisticians again were swayed by the p-value and not tendencies indicated by the raw data.  The failed to understand that your chances are improved by "playing the odds", and gave different answers whether one was playing the odds for an unknown person vs. selecting treatment for themselves.
  3. In previous studies by the authors, they found that "applied researchers presented with not only a p-value but also with a posterior probability based on a noninformative prior were less likely to make dichotomization errors."
The authors also echoed Wasserstein, Lazar, and Cobb's concern that we are setting researchers up for failure: "we teach NHST because that's what the scientific community and journal editors use but they use NHST because that's what we teach them.  Indeed, statistics at the undergraduate level as well as at the graduate level in applied fields is often taught in a rote and recipe-like manner that typically focuses exclusively on the NHST paradigm."

Some of the problems with frequentist statistics are the way in which its methods are misused, especially with regard to dichotomization.  But an approach that is so easy to misuse and which sacrifices direct inference in a futile attempt at objectivity still has fundamental problems.






Sunday, February 5, 2017

A Litany of Problems With p-values

In my opinion, null hypothesis testing and p-values have done significant harm to science.  The purpose of this note is to catalog the many problems caused by p-values.  As readers post new problems in their comments, more will be incorporated into the list, so this is a work in progress.

The American Statistical Association has done a great service by issuing its Statement on Statistical Significance and P-values.  Now it's time to act.  To create the needed motivation to change, we need to fully describe the depth of the problem.

It is important to note that no statistical paradigm is perfect.  Statisticians should choose paradigms that solve the greatest number of real problems and have the fewest number of faults.  This is why I believe that the Bayesian and likelihood paradigms should replace frequentist inference.

Consider an assertion such as "the coin is fair", "treatment A yields the same blood pressure as treatment B", "B yields lower blood pressure than A", or "B lowers blood pressure at least 5mmHg before A."  Consider also a compound assertion such as "A lowers blood pressure by at least 3mmHg and does not raise the risk of stroke."

A. Problems With Conditioning

  1. p-values condition on what is unknown (the assertion of interest; H0) and do not condition on what is known (the data).
  2. This conditioning does not respect the flow of time and information; p-values are backward probabilities.

B. Indirectness

  1. Because of A above, p-values provide only indirect evidence and are problematic as evidence metrics.  They are sometimes monotonically related to the evidence (e.g., when the prior distribution is flat) we need but are not properly calibrated for decision making.
  2. p-values are used to bring indirect evidence against an assertion but cannot bring evidence in favor of the assertion.  
  3. As detailed here, the idea of proof by contradiction is a stretch when working with probabilities, so trying to quantify evidence for an assertion by bringing evidence against its complement is on shaky ground.
  4. Because of A, p-values are difficult to interpret and very few non-statisticians get it right.  The best article on misinterpretations I've found is here.

C. Problem Defining the Event Whose Probability is Computed

  1. In the continuous data case, the probability of getting a result as extreme as that observed with our sample is zero, so the p-value is the probability of getting a result more extreme than that observed.  Is this the correct point of reference?
  2. How does more extreme get defined if there are sequential analyses and multiple endpoints or subgroups?  For sequential analyses do we consider planned analyses are analyses intended to be run even if they were not?

D. Problems Actually Computing p-values

  1. In some discrete data cases, e.g., comparing two proportions, there is tremendous disagreement among statisticians about how p-values should be calculated.  In a famous 2x2 table from an ECMO adaptive clinical trial, 13 p-values have been computed from the same data, ranging from 0.001 to 1.0.  And many statisticians do not realize that Fisher's so-called "exact" test is not very accurate in many cases.
  2. Outside of binomial, exponential, and normal (with equal variance) and a few other cases, p-values are actually very difficult to compute exactly, and many p-values computed by statisticians are of unknown accuracy (e.g., in logistic regression and mixed effects models). The more non-quadratic the log likelihood function the more problematic this becomes in many cases. 
  3. One can compute (sometimes requiring simulation) the type-I error of many multi-stage procedures, but actually computing a p-value that can be taken out of context can be quite difficult and sometimes impossible.  One example: one can control the false discovery probability (incorrectly usually referred to as a rate), and ad hoc modifications of nominal p-values have been proposed, but these are not necessarily in line with the real definition of a p-value.

E. The Multiplicity Mess

  1. Frequentist statistics does not have a recipe or blueprint leading to a unique solution for multiplicity problems, so when many p-values are computed, the way they are penalized for multiple comparisons results in endless arguments.  A Bonferroni multiplicity adjustment is consistent with a Bayesian prior distribution specifying that the probability that all null hypotheses are true is a constant no matter how many hypotheses are tested.  By contrast, Bayesian inference reflects the facts that P(A ∪ B) ≥ max(P(A), P(B)) and P(A ∩ B) ≤ min(P(A), P(B)) when A and B are assertions about a true effect.
  2. There remains controversy over the choice of 1-tailed vs. 2-tailed tests.  The 2-tailed test can be thought of as a multiplicity penalty for being potentially excited about either a positive effect or a negative effect of a treatment.  But few researchers want to bring evidence that a treatment harms patients; a pharmaceutical company would not seek a licensing claim of harm.  So when one computes the probability of obtaining an effect larger than that observed if there is no true effect, why do we too often ignore the sign of the effect and compute the (2-tailed) p-value?
  3. Because it is a very difficult problem to compute p-values when the assertion is compound, researchers using frequentist methods do not attempt to provide simultaneous evidence regarding such assertions and instead rely on ad hoc multiplicity adjustments.
  4. Because of A1, statistical testing with multiple looks at the data, e.g., in sequential data monitoring, is ad hoc and complex.  Scientific flexibility is discouraged.  The p-value for an early data look must be adjusted for future looks.  The p-value at the final data look must be adjusted for the earlier inconsequential looks.  Unblinded sample size re-estimation is another case in point.  If the sample size is expanded to gain more information, there is a multiplicity problem and some of the methods commonly used to analyze the final data effectively discount the first wave of subjects.  How can that make any scientific sense?
  5. Most practitioners of frequentist inference do not understand that multiplicity comes from chances you give data to be extreme, not from chances you give true effects to be present.

F. Problems With Non-Trivial Hypotheses

  1. It is difficult to test non-point hypotheses such as "drug A is similar to drug B".
  2. There is no straightforward way to test compound hypotheses coming from logical unions and intersections. 

G. Inability to Incorporate Context and Other Information

  1. Because extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence, there is a serious problem with the p-value's inability to incorporate context or prior evidence.  A Bayesian analysis of the existence of ESP would no doubt start with a very skeptical prior that would require extraordinary data to overcome, but the bar for getting a "significant" p-value is fairly low. Frequentist inference has a greater risk for getting the direction of an effect wrong (see here for more).
  2. p-values are unable to incorporate outside evidence.  As a converse to 1, strong prior beliefs are unable to be handled by p-values, and in some cases the results in a lack of progress.  Nate Silver in The Signal and the Noise beautifully details how the conclusion that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer was greatly delayed (with a large negative effect on public health) because scientists (especially Fisher) were caught up in the frequentist way of thinking, dictating that only randomized trial data would yield a valid p-value for testing cause and effect.  A Bayesian prior that was very strongly against the belief that smoking was causal is obliterated by the incredibly strong observational data.  Only by incorporating prior skepticism could one make a strong conclusion with non-randomized data in the smoking-lung cancer debate.
  3. p-values require subjective input from the producer of the data rather than from the consumer of the data.

H. Problems Interpreting and Acting on "Positive" Findings

  1. With a large enough sample, a trivial effect can cause an impressively small p-value (statistical significance ≠ clinical significance).
  2. Statisticians and subject matter researchers (especially the latter) sought a "seal of approval" for their research by naming a cutoff on what should be considered "statistically significant", and a cutoff of p=0.05 is most commonly used.  Any time there is a threshold there is a motive to game the system, and gaming (p-hacking) is rampant.  Hypotheses are exchanged if the original H0 is not rejected, subjects are excluded, and because statistical analysis plans are not pre-specified as required in clinical trials and regulatory activities, researchers and their all-too-accommodating statisticians play with the analysis until something "significant" emerges.
  3. When the p-value is small, researchers act as though the point estimate of the effect is a population value.
  4. When the p-value is small, researchers believe that their conceptual framework has been validated.  

I. Problems Interpreting and Acting on "Negative" Findings

  1. Because of B2, large p-values are uninformative and do not assist the researcher in decision making (Fisher said that a large p-value means "get more data").

Wednesday, January 25, 2017

Clinicians' Misunderstanding of Probabilities Makes Them Like Backwards Probabilities Such As Sensitivity, Specificity, and Type I Error

Imaging watching a baseball game, seeing the batter get a hit, and hearing the announcer say "The chance that the batter is left handed is now 0.2!"   No one would care.  Baseball fans are interested in the chance that a batter will get a hit conditional on his being right handed (handedness being already known to the fan), the handedness of the pitcher, etc.  Unless one is an archaeologist or medical examiner, the interest is in forward probabilities conditional on current and past states.  We are interested in the probability of the unknown given the known and the probability of a future event given past and present conditions and events.

Clinicians are people trained in the science and practice of medicine, and most of them are very good at it.  They are also very good at many aspects of research.  But they are generally not taught probability, and this can limit their research skills.  Many excellent clinicians even let their limitations in understanding probability make them believe that their clinical decision making is worse than it actually is.  I have taught many clinicians who say "I need a hard and fast rule so I know how to diagnosis or treat patients.  I need a hard cutoff on blood pressure, HbA1c, etc. so that I know what to do, and the fact that I either treat or not treat the patient means that I don't want to consider a probability of disease but desire a simple classification rule."  This makes the clinician try to influence the statistician to use inefficient, arbitrary methods such as categorization, stratification, and matching.

In reality, clinicians do not act that way when treating patients.  They are smart enough to know that if a patient has cholesterol just over someone's arbitrary threshold they may not start statin therapy right away if the patient has no other risk factors (e.g., smoking) going against him.  They know that sometimes you start a patient on a lower dose and see how she responds, or start one drug and try it for a while and then switch drugs if the efficacy is unacceptable or there is a significant side effect.

So I emphasize the need to understand probabilities when I'm teaching clinicians.  A probability is a self-contained summary of the current information, except for the patient's risk aversion and other utilities.  Clinicians need to be comfortable with a probability of 0.5 meaning "we don't know much" and not requesting a classification of disease/normal that does nothing but cover up the problem.  A classification does not account for gray zones or patient and physician utility functions.

Even physicians who understand the meaning of a probability are often not understanding conditioning.  Conditioning is all important, and conditioning on different things massively changes the meaning of the probabilities being computed.  Every physician I've known has been taught probabilistic medical diagnosis by first learning about sensitivity (sens) and specificity (spec).  These are probabilities that are in backwards time- and information flow order.  How did this happen? Sensitivity, specificity, and receiver operating characteristic curves were developed for radar and radio research in the military.  It was a important to receive radio signals from distant aircraft, and to detect an incoming aircraft on radar.  The ability to detect something that is really there is definitely important.  In the 1950s, virologists appropriated these concepts to measure the performance of viral cultures.  Virus needs to be detected when it's present, and not detected when it's not.  Sensitivity is the probability of detecting a condition when it is truly present, and specificity is the probability of not detecting it when it is truly absent.  One can see how these probabilities would be useful outside of virology and bacteriology when the samples are retrospective, as in a case-control studies.  But I believe that clinicians and researchers would be better off if backward probabilities were not taught or were mentioned only to illustrate how not to think about a problem.

But the way medical students are educated, they assume that sens and spec are what you first consider in a prospective cohort of patients!  This gives the professor the opportunity of teaching  Bayes' rule and requires the use of a supposedly unconditional probability known as prevalence which is actually not very well defined.  The students plugs everything into Bayes' rule and fails to notice that several quantities cancel out.  The result is the following: the proportion of patients with a positive test who have disease, and the proportion with a negative test who have disease.  These are trivially calculated from the cohort data without knowing anything about sens, spec, and Bayes.  This way of thinking harms the student's understanding for years to come and influences those who later engage in clinical and pharmaceutical research to believe that type I error and p-values are directly useful.

The situation in medical diagnosis gets worse when referral bias (also called workup bias) is present.  When certain types of patients do not get a final diagnosis, sens and spec are biased.  For example, younger women with a negative test may not get the painful procedure that yields the final diagnosis.  There are formulas that must be used to correct sens and spec.  But wait!  When Bayes' rule is used to obtain the probability of disease we needed in the first place, these corrections completely cancel out when the usual correction methods are used!  Using forward probabilities in the first place means that one just conditions on age, sex, and result of the initial diagnostic test and no special methods other than (sometimes) logistic regression are required.

There is an analogy to statistical testing.  p-values and type I error are affected by sequential testing and a host of other factors, but forward-time probabilities (Bayesian posterior probabilities) are not.  Posterior probabilities condition on what is known and does not have to imagine alternate paths to getting to what is known (as do sens and spec when workup bias exists).  p-values and type I errors are backwards-information-flow measures, and clinical researchers and regulators come to believe that type I error is the error of interest.  They also very frequently misinterpret p-values.  The p-value is one minus spec, and power is sens.  The posterior probability is exactly analogous to the probability of disease.

Sens and spec are so pervasive in medicine, bioinformatics, and biomarker research that we don't question how silly they would be in other contexts.  Do we dichotomize a response variable so that we can compute the probability that a patient is on treatment B given a "positive" response?  On the contrary we want to know the full continuous distribution of the response given the assigned treatment.  Again this represents forward probabilities.

Saturday, January 14, 2017

p-values and Type I Errors are Not the Probabilities We Need

In trying to guard against false conclusions, researchers often attempt to minimize the risk of a "false positive" conclusion.  In the field of assessing the efficacy of medical and behavioral treatments for improving subjects' outcomes, falsely concluding that a treatment is effective when it is not is an important consideration.   Nowhere is this more important than in the drug and medical device regulatory environments, because a treatment thought not to work can be given a second chance as better data arrive, but a treatment judged to be effective may be approved for marketing, and if later data show that the treatment was actually not effective (or was only trivially effective) it is difficult to remove the treatment from the market if it is safe.  The probability of a treatment not being effective is the probability of "regulator's regret."  One must be very clear on what is conditioned upon (assumed) in computing this probability.  Does one condition on the true effectiveness or does one condition on the available data?  Type I error conditions on the treatment having no effect and does not entertain the possibility that the treatment actually worsens the patients' outcomes.  Can one quantify evidence for making a wrong decision if one assumes that all conclusions of non-zero effect are wrong up front because H0 was assumed to be true?  Aren't useful error probabilities the ones that are not based on assumptions about what we are assessing but rather just on the data available to us?

Statisticians have convinced regulators that long-run operating characteristics of a testing procedure should rule the day, e.g., if we did 1000 clinical trials where efficacy was always zero, we want no more than 50 of these trials to be judged as "positive."  Never mind that this type I error operating characteristic does not refer to making a correct judgment for the clinical trial at hand.  Still, there is a belief that type I error is the probability of regulator's regret (a false positive), i.e., that the treatment is not effective when the data indicate it is.  In fact, clinical trialists have been sold a bill of goods by statisticians.  No probability derived from an assumption that the treatment has zero effect can provide evidence about that effect.  Nor does it measure the chance of the error actually in question.  All probabilities are conditional on something, and to be useful they must condition on the right thing.  This usually means that what is conditioned upon must be knowable.

The probability of regulator's regret is the probability that a treatment doesn't work given the data. So the probability we really seek is the probability that the treatment has no effect or that it has a backwards effect.  This is precisely one minus the Bayesian posterior probability of efficacy.

In reality, there is unlikely to exist a treatment that has exactly zero effect.  As Tukey argued in 1991, the effects of treatments A and B are always different, to some decimal place.  So the null hypothesis is always false and the type I error could be said to be always zero.

The best paper I've read about the many ways in which p-values are misinterpreted is Statistical tests, P values, confidence intervals, and power: a guide to misinterpretations written by a group of renowned statisticians.  One of my favorite quotes from this paper is

Thus to claim that the null P value is the probability that chance alone produced the observed association is completely backwards: The P value is a probability computed assuming chance was operating alone. The absurdity of the common backwards interpretation might be appreciated by pondering how the P value, which is a probability deduced from a set of assumptions (the statistical model), can possibly refer to the probability of those assumptions.
In 2016 the American Statistical Association took a stand against over-reliance on p-values. This would have made a massive impact on all branches of science had it been issued 50 years ago but better late than never.

Update 2017-01-19

Though believed to be true by many non-statisticians, p-values are not the probability that H0 is true, and to turn them into such probabilities requires Bayes' rule.  If you are going to use Bayes' rule you might as well formulate the problem as a full Bayesian model.  This has many benefits, not the least of them being that you can select an appropriate prior distribution and you will get exact inference.  Attempts by several authors to convert p-values to probabilities of interest (just as sensitivity and specificity are converted to probability of disease once one knows the prevalence of disease) have taken the prior to be discontinuous, putting a high probability on H0 being exactly true.  In my view it is much more sensible to believe that there is no discontinuity in the prior at the point represented by H0, encapsulating prior knowledge instead by saying that values near H0 are more likely if no relevant prior information is available.

Returning to the non-relevance of type I error as discussed above, and ignoring for the moment that long-run operating characteristics do not directly assist us in making judgments about the current experiment, there is a subtle problem that leads researchers to believe that by controlling type I "error" they think they have quantified the probability of misleading evidence.  As discussed at length by my colleague Jeffrey Blume, once an experiment is done the probability that positive evidence is misleading is not type I error.  And what exactly does "error" mean in "type I error?"  It is the probability of rejecting H0 when H0 is exactly true, just as the p-value is the probability of obtaining data more impressive than that observed given H0 is true.  Are these really error probabilities?  Perhaps ... if you have been misled earlier into believing that we should base conclusions on how unlikely the observed data would have been observed under H0.  Part of the problem is in the loaded word "reject."  Rejecting H0 by seeing data that are unlikely if H0 is true is perhaps the real error.

The "error quantification" truly needed is the probability that a treatment doesn't work given all the current evidence, which as stated above is simply one minus the Bayesian posterior probability of positive efficacy.

Update 2017-01-20

Type I error control is an indirect way to being careful about claims of effects.  It should never have been the preferred method for achieving that goal.  Seen another way, we would choose type I error as the quantity to be controlled if we wanted to:

  • require the experimenter to visualize an infinite number of experiments that might have been run, and assume that the current experiment could be exactly replicated
  • be interested in long-run operating characteristics vs. judgments needing to be made for the one experiment at hand
  • be interested in the probability that other replications result in data more extreme than mine if there is no treatment effect
  • require early looks at the data to be discounted for future looks
  • require past looks at the data to be discounted for earlier inconsequential looks
  • create other multiplicity considerations, all of them arising from the chances you give data to be extreme as opposed to the chances that you give effects to be positive
  • data can be more extreme for a variety of reasons such as trying to learn faster by looking more often or trying to learn more by comparing more doses or more drugs
The Bayesian approach focuses on the chances you give effects to be positive and does not have multiplicity issues (potential issues such as examining treatment effects in multiple subgroups are handled by the shrinkage that automatically results when you use the 'right' Bayesian hierarchical model).

The p-value is the chance that someone else would observe data more extreme than mine if the effect is truly zero (if they could exactly replicate my experiment) and not the probability of no (or a negative) effect of treatment given my data.

Update 2017-05-10

As discussed in Gamalo-Siebers at al DOI: 10.1002/pst.1807 the type I error is the probability of making an assertion of an effect when no such effect exists. It is not the probability of regret for a decision maker, e.g., it is not the probability of a drug regulator's regret. The probability of regret is the probability that the drug doesn't work or is harmful when the decision maker had decided it was helpful. It is the probability of harm or no benefit when an assertion of benefit is made. This is best thought of as the probability of harm or no benefit given the data which is one minus the probability of efficacy. Prob(assertion|no benefit) is not equal to 1-Prob(benefit|data).

Update 2017-11-28

Type I ("false positive") error probability would be a useful concept while a study is being designed.  Frequentists speak of type I error control, but after a study is completed, the only way to commit a type I error is to know with certainty that an effect is exactly zero.  But then the study would not have been necessary.  So type I error remains a long-run operating characteristic for a sequence of hypothetical studies.

Thinking of p-values that a sequence of hypothetical studies might provide, when the type I error is α this means P(p-value < α | zero effect) = α.   Neither a single p-value nor α is the probability of a decision error.   They are "what if" probabilities, if the effect is zero.  The p-value for a single study is merely the probability that data more extreme than ours would have been observed had the effect been exactly zero and the experiment was capable of being re-run infinitely often.  It is nothing more than this.  It is not a false positive probability for the experiment at hand.  To compute the false positive probability one would need a prior distribution for the effect (and for the p-value to be perfectly accurate which is rare), and one might as well be fully Bayesian and enjoy all the Bayesian benefits.

Null Hypothesis Significance Testing Never Worked

Much has been written about problems with our most-used statistical paradigm: frequentist null hypothesis significance testing (NHST), p-values, type I and type II errors, and confidence intervals.  Rejection of straw-man null hypotheses leads researchers to believe that their theories are supported, and the unquestioning use of a threshold such as p<0.05 has resulted in hypothesis substitution, search for subgroups, and other gaming that has badly damaged science.  But we seldom examine whether the original idea of NHST actually delivered on its goal of making good decisions about effects, given the data.

NHST is based on something akin to proof by contradiction.  The best non-mathematical definition of the p-value I've ever seen is due to Nicholas Maxwell: "the degree to which the data are embarrassed by the null hypothesis."  p-values provide evidence against something, never in favor of something, and are the basis for NHST.  But proof by contradiction is only fully valid in the context of rules of logic where assertions are true or false without any uncertainty.  The classic paper The Earth is Round (p<.05) by Jacob Cohen has a beautiful example pointing out the fallacy of combining probabilistic ideas with proof by contradiction in an attempt to make decisions about an effect.

The following is almost but not quite the reasononing of null hypothesis rejection: 
If the null hypothesis is correct, then this datum (D) can not occur.
It has, however, occurred.
Therefore the null hypothesis is false. 
If this were the reasoning of H0 testing, then it would be formally correct. … But this is not the reasoning of NHST.  Instead, it makes this reasoning probabilistic, as follows: 
If the null hypothesis is correct, then these data are highly unlikely.
These data have occurred.
Therefore, the null hypothesis is highly unlikely. 
By making it probabilistic, it becomes invalid.  … the syllogism becomes formally incorrect and leads to a conclusion that is not sensible: 
If a person is an American, then he is probably not a member of Congress.  (TRUE, RIGHT?)
This person is a member of Congress.
Therefore, he is probably not an American. (Pollard & Richardson, 1987) 
… The illusion of attaining improbability or the Bayesian Id's wishful thinking error …
  
Induction has long been a problem in the philosophy of science.  Meehl (1990) attributed to the distinguished philosopher Morris Raphael Cohen the saying "All logic texts are divided into two parts.  In the first part, on deductive logic, the fallacies are explained; in the second part, on inductive logic, they are committed."
Sometimes when an approach leads to numerous problems, the approach itself is OK and the problems can be repaired.  But besides all the other problems caused by NHST (including need for arbitrary multiplicity adjustments, need for consideration of investigator intentions and not just her actions, rejecting H0 for trivial effects, incentivizing gaming, interpretation difficulties, etc.) it may be the case that the overall approach is defective and should not have been adopted.

With all of the amazing things Ronald Fisher gave us, and even though he recommended against the unthinking rejection of H0, his frequentist approach and dislike of the Bayesian approach did us all a disservice.  He called the Bayesian method invalid and was possibly intellectually dishonest when he labeled it as "inverse probability."  In fact the p-value is an indirect inverse probability and Bayesian posterior probabilities are direct forwards probabilities that do not condition on a hypothesis, and the Bayesian approach has not only been shown to be valid, but it actually delivers on its promise.